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THE LAMPSON WILL CASE.
William Lampson, a resident of LeRoy, N. Y., died Feb-
ruary 14, 1897. at the age of fifty-seven years. Seven weeks be-
fore his death he executed his last will and testament. His per-
sonal property amounted to over $400,ooo, and he left real
estate of the value of about $ioo,ooo. The entire estate, except
about $35,000, is given to Yale University, the disposing clause
beginning, "I give and bequeath unto my alma mater, the cor-
poration of Yale College." Mr. Lampson was a bachelor and
his nearest relative is an aged aunt, Mrs. Laura A. Brooks, re-
siding in Minnesota. Under the New York statute of distribu-
tions she would be entitled in case of intestacy to the entire per-
sonal estate, and consequently to the amount represented by
any invalid bequest. The heirs at law, besides this aunt, con-
sist of more than fifty cousins and descendants of deceased
cousins. The testator had known but few of these cousins and
had seen very little of any of them. He had known little of his
aunt and had not seen her for many years.
A contest arose upon the probate of the will, and the request
made by the Editor of the YALE LAW JOURNAL for a statement
of the questions involved can be best complied with by explain-
ing quite fully the claim made in behalf of the contestant, Mrs.
Brooks, and by quoting at some length from the opinion pre-
pared by the writer in disposing of the case.
Section 2624 of the New York Code of Civil Procedure con-
fers upon Surrogate's Courts power to determine the validity of
testamentary gifts of personal property, but no such power ex-
ists as to devises. Should the title to the real estate ever be
tested it must be in the Supreme Court by an action in eject-
ment brought by the heirs at law against the devisee. In case
the bequests to Yale should be sustained by the higher courts,
such decision will, although indirectly, effectually dispose of the
validity of the devise, since the same principle would apply in
the disposition of the real estate as in the case of the personal
property. It was conceded upon the hearing that the will must
be admitted to probate and letters testamentary issued. The
single ground upon which the gifts to Yale University are
assailed is that the will was executed less than two months be-
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fore the death of testator. The statute which it is claimed is
contravened is Section 6 of Chapter 3Y9 of the Laws of 1848.
The Act is entitled, "An Act for the incorporation of benevo-
lent, charitable, scientific and missionary societies." The law
provided that societies formed thereunder might take property
by gift or will. The closing paragraph of Section 6 directs that
"no devise or bequest shall be valid in any will which shall not
have been made and executed at least two months before the
death of the testator."
The case of Hollis v. Drew Theological Seminary and The
Wesleyan University, 95 N. Y. 166, decided in 1884, was relied
upon by both parties to the controversy. The will was exe-
cuted less than two months before testator's death, and con-
tained bequests to the two defendants named, one a New Jersey,
the other a Connecticut corporation. The opinion was written
by Judge Earl. Stated concisely, the case holds (a) that the
two-months restriction contained in Section 6 applies only to cor-
porations formed under the act of which the section forms a
part, and cannot be extended to societies organized under other
general laws or by special charters; (b) that the said section has
no application whatever to corporations chartered by other
States; (c) that bequests to foreign corporations for humani-
tarian purposes are not against public policy: and (d) that there
is no public or legislative policy against bequests made within
two months of death.
With respect to all these matters the decision was clear and
unequivocal, but a single observation made by the learned
Judge who wrote the opinion has been seized by the contestant
and made the foundation of the present controversy. These
are the words referred to: "If there were a general law in this State
that no bequest to any of such corporations should be valid, unless contained
in a will made at least two months before the death of the testator, that
would indicate a general public policy which the courts of this State would
enforce against foreign corporations which might come into this State,
although such a limitation was not imposed by the laws creating them."
Reference must now be made to certain recent legislation in
this State, which the contestant insists marks a departure in the
policy of our laws so radical that bequests made within two
months must now be deemed as so opposed to public and legisla-
tive policy that the courts must enforce the restriction even
against foreign corporations.
On the 27 th day of April, 1892, the University Law was
passed. This law, like the numerous other enactments which
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have been prepared by the Statutory Revision Commission of this
State, gathered together, with many additions and modifica-
tions, the laws which had been passed from time to time on this
subject, and which were scattered through the statute books. In
this way one comprehensive and harmonious statute took the
place of a large number of imperfect laws and amendments,
often difficult to find and in some measure conflicting. By the
provisions of this law, sixty-six acts of the Legislature, passed
in almost as many different years, besides considerable portions
of the Revised Statutes, were repealed, the repealed portions
having been so far as was desired reenacted in the new law.
The statute defines the term "University" as meaning the Uni-
versity of the State of New York, and Section 24 of the act pro-
vides, "The institutions of the University shall include all insti-
tutions of higher education which are now or may hereafter be
incorporated in this State."
On the 18th day of May, 1892, the General Corporation Law
was enacted. As its name indicates, this law is general in char-
acter, classifying the different kinds of corporations, providing
for the methods of formation, the limitation of powers, the
acquisition of property, besides various other matters such as.
would naturally be included in a law of this description. Sec-
tion ii is in part as follows: "Grant of general powers. Every
corporation as such has power, though not specified in the law
under which it is incorporated: 3, to acquire by grant, gift,
purchase, devise or bequest * * * subject to such limita-
tions as may be prescribed by law."
Among the kinds of corporations provided for by the general
corporation law of 1892 are membership corporations; and in
1895 the Legislature, following out the scheme of the revision
commission, passed the Membership Corporation Law. At the
end of this act, as in the case of the other laws prepared by the
commission, there is appended a schedule of laws repealed.
This schedule includes 114 acts of the Legislature repealed in
full and eighteen repealed in part. In the latter class is found
the act hereinbefore referred to for the incorporation of benevo-
lent, charitable, scientific and missionary societies, which is set
down in its chronological order in the schedule as follows:
"18 4 8--Chapter 319. All except Section 6."
The claims advanced by counsel were to the effect that the
repealing schedule of the Membership Corporation Law having
preserved Section 6 of the Act of 1848, while .repealing the rest
of the law, this section is to be deemed as engrafted upon and
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made a part of the law which thus saved it from repeal, and that
the General Corporation Law of 1892, by providing that corpora-
tions formed under it might take by devise or bequest "subject
to such limitations as may be provided by law" must now be
construed as including Section 6 as Among such "limitations."
It was therefore claimed in behalf of contestant that the reten-
tion of Section 6 under the circumstances referred to marked so
general a change in the legislative policy of the State that the
prohibition against bequests made within two monfhs of death
must, in spite of the decision in Hollis v. Drew Theological
Seminary, be extended to an educational institution chartered
by another State. In order to render this claim of any force, it
was further contended that all colleges, being non-stock corpora-
tions, are therefore under the classification of the General Cor-
poration law, membership corporations, and are to be classed
among the corporations provided for by the Membership Cor-
poration Law of 1895. The claim was distinctly made that Yale
University is such an institution as, if organized under the laws
of the State of New York, would be a membership corporation.
Stated more concisely, and condensed into a single proposi-
tion, the contestant sought to maintain that the recent legisla-
tion referred to, taken together, amounts to a general law that
bequests to corporations of the kind provided for by the Act of
x848 shall be invalid unless contained in a will made more than
two months before death, and that the courts in the enforcement
of a supposed public policy must now -apply the principle sug-
gested in the italicized quotation from the Hollis case, and ex-
tend the prohibition to foreign corporations of the same class.
Discussing the main proposition advanced by contestant, the
opinion states:
"The proposition that Section 6 has become 'a part of the
Membership Corporation Act' and has acquired added force by.
the manner of its retention and by virtue of the repeal of the re-
mainder of the Act of 1848, is vital to the contention made by
the contestant, for it is only upon this theory that the force of
the decision in Hollis v. Drew can be met, or overcome. I am
wholly unable to discover any reason or authority for the claim
that this section is to be given any different force or effect under
or by reason of the circumstances of its repeal, than it would
have been entitled to had a separate and distinct law been
enacted for the sole purpose of repealing Chapter 39 of the
Laws of 1848, excepting Section 6. The doctrine is new and
surprising that where an act of the Legislature is all repealed
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except one section, such section becomes by virtue of the excep-
tion a constituexit part of the repealing law, or obtains any new
or differelit force or effect by reason of the obliteration of the
sections which had formed part of the original act. The
learned counsel for the contestant in a brief evincing the greatest
labor and research, wholly fails to cite a decision or authority
promulgating or suggesting any such doctrine or containing an
intimation that such has ever been recognized as the law.
"On the other hand, how obvious is the purpose for the reten-
tion of Section 6. A large number of societies had been organ-
ized under this act during the course of forty-seven years. All
were subject to the provisions against the validity of bequests
made within two months of death. No good reason sdemed to
exist why these societies should be relieved from the restriction,
which by the very terms of their organization had been assented
to. Section 6 begins with the words, 'Any corporation formed
under this Act.' The 'Act' having been repealed and the sec-
tion left, as counsel for proponents describes it, 'floating and
.unattached,' it might be said to have no meaning and its reten-
tion to serve no purpose, except for the fact that the opening
words of the section put the investigator to the inquiry as to
what act is referred to, and his research is at once rewarded by
the discovery that it is an act for the formation of benevolent,
charitable, scientific and missionary societies. It would be
further discovered that the section which had been saved from
repeal, by its express words referred to corporations which
could no longer be formed because of the repeal, and the one
natural and logical reason whicl would be assigned for its re-
tention, the one possible office to be fulfilled by it, would be to
continue in force the restrictions which it contained as applied
to corporations already formed under the act. The repeal of
the law did not repeal the societies to which it had given birth,
it simply prevented the organization of any more corporations
under the law, and the preservation of the restrictive section
simply held the societies already organized to the basis upon
which they Were originally formed."
The opinion cites Endlich on the interpretation of statutes;
Bank for Savings, 3 Wallace, U. S. 495-513; and Ex parte Crow
Dog, 109 U. S. 556-561, with the following comment:
"There is the highest authority for the doctrine that for th
purpose of determining what force shall be given to portions of
a statute excepted from repeal, resort should be had to the act
itself as it stood at the time of the repeal, and the doctrine is of
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the utmost value in the decision of this case, and in meeting, as
it seems to me it does, the arguments made in behalf of contest-
ant."
The opinion seeks to controvert the claim that Yale is an in-
stitution analogous to a membership corporation as defined by
the Act of 1895. A portion of the discussion is here given:
"As I have already shown, even before the enactment of the
General Corporation Law, the University Law had been passed,
providing a comprehensive scheme for the formation and gov-
ernment of colleges and universities, and directing in explicit
terms how all such institutions should be incorporated, by meth-
ods wholly outside the General or Membership Corporation
Laws. The University Law was the work of the revision com-
mission, and it seems apparent that having by the Act of April
27, x892, provided a complete system for the incorporation of
colleges and universities, it was not intended by the later Act of
1895 to include such institutions of learning along with societies
so wholly different in character as those provided for by the
Membership Corporation Law."
Upon the argument, counsel for Yale entered into an elabo-
rate and learned discussion for the purpose of demonstrating
that Yale was not such an institution as could at any time have
been formed in this State under the Act of 1848. While in the
main coinciding with this view, the opinion disclaims any inten-
tion to base the decision on this ground:
"It may well be doubted whether with the complete and har-
monious system of law in this State for the formation of educa-
tional institutions and the stringent power of supervision which
the law places in the hands of the Regents of the University, the
Legislature ever intended that there should be in existence at
the same time another law under which similar institutions
might be formed free from these restrictions, and at liberty to
confer degrees and award diplomas upon such terms and subject
to such regulations only as the inistitutions might see fit to
impose. It is sufficient to say that Yale University is not a
domestic corporation; it was not incorporated under the Act of
x848; there is no public or legislative policy against bequests
made within two months of death; Yale is not within the scope
-of the statute prohibiting such bequests; Section 6 has no
greater force than before the repeal of the other sections of the
same law; the phrase used in the General .Corporation Act,
'subject to such limitations as may be prescribed by law,' has
no application to this case. It would only add another column
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to the structure if it were to be said, as counsel for the univer-
sity claim, that purely educational institutions were never
intended to be incorporated and in no single instance have been
incorporated under the Act of 1848. However strong the argu-
ment of counsel, and however correct their conclusions, I do not
deem it best to base my decision on this ground."
The case of Vanderpoel v. Gorman, 14o N. Y. 563, discussed
in the opinion, is of much interest, both on account of its direct
bearing upon the question at issue, and as impairing the force
and effect which should be given to the italicized quotation from
the Hollis case in the attempt to apply it to the present contro-
versy. The Vanderpoel case decides that the New York statute
prohibiting transfers or assignments of property by corporations
iii contemplation of insolvency cannot be applied to a foreign
corporation doing business in this State.
Although not discussed by counsel the court called attention
to the fact that since the enactment of the Membership Cor-
poration law of 1895, that being the law, as contended by coun-
sel, which evinced a changed legislative policy with respect to
bequests made within two months of death, the Legislature has
by special charter incorporated several societies of the kind pro-
vided for by the Act of 1848, authorizing these societies to take
by bequest without restriction and in two instances has by
amendment removed restrictions which in effect prohibited such
bequests. Commenting on these recent statutes the opinion
states:
"These recent acts of the Legislature answer more fully than
any mere argument could do, the claim that it is now contrary
to public policy to permit gifts to corporations when made by
will executed within the two-months limit. Surely 'that cannot
be enforced as public policy by the courts which the Legislature
one day prohibits, in some cases, and another day permits in
other cases.' "
The opinion concludes:
"I have not attempted to discuss this case in every aspect
presented by the learned counsel for the contestant in his very
able brief and oral argument. To have done so would have been
to write a treatise, and yet that would afford no reason why the
discussion should not be had if the case required it. The issue,
after all, is one of statutory construction and may be confined
within narrow limits. The decision which has been reached
seems to me the only one which can be rendered with due regard
to legal principles and without attributing to the Legislature
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and the revisers a disposition to render complex and uncertain
that which could as easily have been placed beyond contro-
versy. I am fully satisfied that there has been no change in the
legislative policy of this State with reference to the matters
which have been discussed in this opinion, certainly none add-
ing to the restrictions imposed upon charitable or educational
bequests. I believe the purpose in retaining Section 6 of the
Act of 1848 was as has here been pointed out, and that should
the time ever come when the Legislature shall see fit to further
prohibit bequests made shortly before death, and to extend that
prohibition to foreign corporations, it will not be done by com-
plicated, tortuous, ambiguous and uncertain methods, but rather
by direct and clear statutory provision."
An appeal is to be taken from the decision. Should affirm-
ance follow, counsel for the contestant make the statement that
they will then avail themselves of the provisions of Section
2653a of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section provides
that the validity of the probate of a will may be determined in an
action in the Supreme Court for the county in which such pro-
bate was had. All heirs at law and next of kin and all inter-
ested persons, including the executors, must be made parties.
The issue to be tried is confined to the question whether the
writing is the last will and testament of the testator. This issue
is tried by a jury, and the statute provides that the verdict shall
be conclusive as to real and personal property, unless a new trial
be granted or the judgment thereon be vacated or reversed. It
will be seen that this is not an appeal or in the nature of an
appeal from the decision in Surrogate's Court, but a new and
independent action resorted to, ordinarily, for the purpose of
procuring the verdict of a jury on the questions of testamentary
capacity and undue influence.
Safford E. North.
BATAVIA, N. Y., February 22, 1898.
